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ABSTRACT.  Overconfidence can have important economic consequences, but has 
received little direct testing within the discipline.  We test for overconfidence in 
forecasts of own absolute or relative performance in two unfamiliar experimental 
tasks.  Given their choice of effort at the tasks, participants have incentives to forecast 
accurately, and have opportunities for feedback, learning and revision.  Forecast 
accuracy is evaluated at both the aggregate level, and at the individual level using 
realized outcomes. We find very limited evidence of overconfidence, with zero mean 
error or under-confidence more prevalent.  Under-confidence is greatest in tasks with 






Keywords: overconfidence, forecast errors, self-assessment 
 
JEL Classifications: C91 D83 D84 J24 
 
 
1 Department of Economics, College of Business & Economics, University of 
Canterbury, Private Bag 4800, Christchurch, New Zealand, 
jeremy.clark@canterbury.ac.nz. Phone 011 643 364 2308 Fax: 011 643 364 2635 
 
2 Commerce Division, Lincoln University, PO Box 84, Canterbury, New Zealand, 
friesenl@lincoln.ac.nz. Phone: 011 643 325 3627 Fax: 011 643 325 3847 
 
 
    2
1. Introduction 
 
“The over-weening conceit which the greater part of men have of their own abilities, 
is an ancient evil remarked by the philosophers and moralists of all ages.” 
(Adam Smith in The Wealth of Nations, 1776) 
 
Social commentators of many generations have recognised the human 
tendency to be overconfident.  Modern social psychology has confirmed these 
observations, with the pervasiveness of overconfidence one of the most robust and 
undisputed findings in the field.  The most well known manifestation of 
overconfidence is the “above-average” effect, where most people report they expect 
an above-average likelihood of high starting salaries and job satisfaction, staying 
married, having gifted children, and other positive life events (Weinstein, 1980; Baker 
and Emery, 1993).  Conversely, most people report a below-average risk of car 
accidents (Svenson, 1981), job loss or unemployment (Weinstein, 1980), and health 
problems (Weinstein, 1982, 1984, 1987, 1989, 1998; Weinstein and Klein, 1995; 
Miller et al., 1990).  People are also systematically overconfident about the precision 
of their knowledge (Lichtenstein et al., 1982), and prone to self-attribution bias, over-
attributing success to their own skill but blaming chance for failure (Taylor and 
Brown, 1988). 
Few appear exempt from overconfidence, which apparently afflicts students 
and the general population alike (Weinstein, 1987).  Attempts at verbal warnings and 
“de-biasing” manipulations have been largely unsuccessful (Weinstein and Klein, 
1995).  The only group who seem consistently realistic are the clinically depressed 
(Alloy and Ahrens, 1987; Pyszczynski and Holt, 1987).  However, the degree of 
overconfidence is variable and tends to be more prevalent for events over which   3
                                                
respondents perceive some measure of control, or lack personal experience, or judge 
to be infrequent (Weinstein, 1980, 1982, 1984, 1987).   
Overconfidence can have significant economic consequences because people 
rely on self-assessments when choosing career paths, investing in higher education, 
starting businesses, committing to marriage, and so on.  Even Adam Smith (1776, p. 
211) recognized that the “presumptuous hope of success” would result in too much 
effort exerted in the pursuit of high-risk and return careers.
1  More recently, 
overconfidence about one’s relative ability has been suggested as an explanation for 
the high rate of new business failures (Camerer and Lovallo, 1999), and for excessive 
job market search and unemployment (Dubra, 2004).  In addition, if parties 
overestimate their chance of success at binding arbitration, expensive bargaining 
impasses are more likely to occur (Babcock and Loewenstein 1997; Dickinson, 2005).  
Conversely, underestimating one’s risk of negative life events may result in failure to 
undertake appropriate risk-reducing activities and expenditures (Weinstein, 1982). 
In financial markets, overconfidence in one’s own knowledge and ability can 
lead to excessive trading and lower returns (Barber and Odeon, 2001), distortions in 
corporate investment decisions (Malmendier and Tate, 2005), value-reducing mergers 
(Roll, 1986), and various security market anomalies (Daniel et al., 1998).  Some 
authors even suggest that overconfidence may render capital markets inefficient 
(Manove and Padilla, 1999). 
On the other hand, the fact that overconfidence seems conspicuously absent 
only among the clinically depressed (Alloy and Ahrens, 1987; Pyszczynski et al., 
1987) has led some psychologists to suggest that overconfidence could be beneficial, 
serving to "foster motivation, persistence at tasks, and ultimately more effective 
performance" (Taylor and Brown, 1988, p. 199).  Two recent papers that model the 
 
1 Frank and Cook (1995) describe these as “winner-take-all” careers.   4
                                                
benefits of overconfidence are Benabou and Tirole (2002), where overconfidence can 
help overcome imperfect willpower, and Compte and Postlewaite (2004) where 
overconfidence increases the chance of success in risky activities. 
While economists are increasingly recognising the potential consequences of 
overconfidence, little direct testing has been undertaken.  Most of the studies reported 
above either assume overconfidence exists and focus on its consequences, or test for it 
only indirectly.  Indeed, testing for the presence of overconfidence is inherently 
difficult.  In particular, how should the accuracy of individual expectations be 
evaluated?  A person may quite rightly expect to be above average in terms of career 
success or below average in terms of heart attack risk, for example.  In addition, over 
time a person’s actions may change their risk exposure, rendering any initial 
assessment incorrect.
2
The approach taken in psychology has been to test for relative forecast bias in 
the aggregate, thereby avoiding the need for individual benchmarks.  This approach 
was pioneered by Weinstein (1980) who asked individuals to rate their chance of 
experiencing a pleasant or unpleasant outcome relative to their peers using a seven 
point scale centred at zero, with –3 for “much below average” and +3 for “much 
above average”.  Evaluated at a group level it is not possible for everyone to be either 
above- or below average.  This methodology has resulted in the robust “above-
average” effect described earlier. 
In contrast, the economists who have investigated forecast bias have tended to 
elicit individuals' quantitative probability estimates of future outcomes, such as 
income or longevity.  These predictions are then compared with either current 
aggregate realizations (Hamermesh, 1985; Fischoff et al., 2000; Hurd and Rohwedder, 
 
2 Eliciting expectations is also problematic because people have difficulty conceptualising 
probabilities, and responses can depend on the method used.  We address this issue in Section 2.   5
2003) or, where longitudinal data is available, with actual individual realizations (Das 
and van Soest, 1997, 1999; Dominitz, 1998; Smith, 2001).  The findings on 
overconfidence using these methods have been much more equivocal.  For example, 
Hamermesh (1985) found that while respondents were pessimistic about survival to 
age 60, they were optimistic about surviving to age 80.  Teenagers were found by 
Fischoff et al. (2000) to be overconfident about future career success, but also have a 
greatly exaggerated belief of early death.  Using longitudinal data, Dominitz (1998) 
found that Americans were too optimistic about changes in future income, while Das 
and van Soest (1997, 1999) found that Dutch households generally underestimated 
future income changes. 
We take a different approach in this paper and use an incentive-based 
experiment to directly measure people’s forecasts of their own absolute or relative 
performance in two initially unfamiliar computerized tasks.  One task involves 
searching over a spreadsheet for the maximum value of a function, the other decoding 
five-letter words.  Subjects are rewarded both for performance on the tasks and 
accuracy of their predictions.  Because we use individual realized outcomes for a 
benchmark, we are able to test for forecast bias in both relative and absolute settings, 
and compare our results in the relative case with Weinstein’s hypothetical group level 
evaluations.   
We also ensure that subjects receive feedback about forecast error, having 
them play two practice rounds, then two sets of ten rounds of each task.  They revise 
their forecasts for the second set of a task after playing the first.  Finally, by collecting 
descriptive data on subjects and passively measuring their keyboard inputs for each 
task, we can also test whether variation in forecast error is predicted by subjects’ 
characteristics, whether overconfidence does lead to better outcomes via better effort, 
and whether subjects learn to be better forecasters. We find that overconfidence is not as robust as the psychology literature 
would suggest, with zero mean error or under-confidence more prevalent.  We also 
find no evidence that ex ante overconfidence confers any advantage in subsequent 
outcomes either directly or indirectly via effort quantity or quality.  Regarding 
learning, individuals do update forecasts in the direction of initial outcomes, though 
insufficiently to eliminate subsequent forecast errors as ability improves.  Finally, we 
find intriguing evidence that people have less difficulty predicting their success 
relative to others than against an absolute performance threshold. 
  The remainder of the paper runs as follows.  Section 2 describes our 
experimental design.  Section 3 presents our results, and Section 4 a brief discussion 
and conclusion. 
 
2.  Experimental Design: Mountain Climbing and Espionage 
    Taking our cues from the psychology literature on overconfidence, we chose 
a design where subjects would have to make predictions about tasks over which they 
initially lacked personal experience, yet perceived some measure of control.  In order 
to reflect economic contexts where overconfidence may play a role, we also needed 
tasks that required real yet quantifiable effort, diverse skills, and that provided 
opportunities for learning.  We settled on two.  The first task was to maximize an 
unknown function by searching across contiguous cells of a computer spreadsheet.  
The underlying function generating the values on the spreadsheet was:  
22
31 2 1 2 ( , ) { [( ) ( ) ( )( )]} f x y b xb yb xbyb α =− − + − + −−   (1) 
 
where x and y are the coordinates of a cell, and α, b1, b2, and b3 are parameters.  This 
task is a simplified version of the two-variable optimisation problem used by van 
Dijk, Sonnemans, and Winden (2001) to examine the effect of different incentive 
  6  7
                                                
schemes on work effort.  Within each round the unknown function (1) took on the 
same smooth, paraboloid shape, with a maximum value (or "height") of 100,400.  The 
most direct route to the peak always required 200 moves.  With 4 contiguous moves 
allowed per second, 240 moves were possible within a 60 second round.  Between 
rounds, the location of the function’s maximum was shifted randomly around the 
circumference of a circle centred at the spreadsheet’s origin.  Thus, the degree of 
difficulty remained the same in each round.  A reproduction of the spreadsheet seen 
by subjects is given in Figure 1. 
The second task we chose was decoding five letter words, drawn from a 
random sample of 1155 such words taken from the 1993 Shorter Oxford English 
Dictionary.
3  The coding scheme for each round was comprised of a unique letter-for-
letter mapping, and was randomly reset between rounds.  With 4 letter guesses 
allowed per second, 240 letter guesses were possible within a 60 second round.  A 
reproduction of the decoding task is given in Figure 2.   
Both the maximization and verbal decoding tasks were fully computerized.
4 
Each participant read computerized instructions for one task, tried it for 22 rounds, 
read instructions for the other task, and tried it for 22 rounds.  These 22 rounds were 
comprised of two practice rounds, a first set of ten, and a second set of ten.  Thus, 
each participant completed two sets of one task, then two sets of the other.  In half of 
sessions, the maximization task came first, and in half the verbal decoding task came 
first. 
Forecasts of own performance in a task were first elicited after the two 
practice rounds.  Subjects were asked how many of the first and second sets of ten 
rounds they thought they would win.  After completing the first ten rounds, subjects 
 
3 Proper names and obscure words were avoided. 
4 The experimental instructions are included for reviewers in Supplementary Appendix A.   8
                                                
were reminded of their initial forecast for the second ten rounds, and asked to re-enter 
a prediction, whether revised or not.  This sequence was repeated for both tasks.  
Subjects were given immediate feedback on whether they had won or lost each round, 
and were told of their earnings accumulation from prediction and performance after 
each set.  Figure 3 illustrates the sequence of decisions subjects made for a given task.   
 
2.1 Criteria for Winning 
  We looked for evidence of overconfidence in both relative and absolute 
settings.  Twelve subjects participated in each session.  In the relative treatments, the 
best five of the twelve participants won each round.
5  For the maximization task, the 
five of twelve participants who had reached the highest spreadsheet value by the end 
of a round won, while for the verbal task, the five of twelve participants who had 
decoded the greatest number of letters by the end of the round won.  Ties were 
automatically broken at random, so that there were always exactly five winners each 
round, yielding an average win rate of 4.17 in each set of ten rounds.   
  In the absolute treatments, subjects had to meet an absolute standard to win 
each round.  For the maximization task, the standard was to reach a value of 100,000 
on the spreadsheet within 60 seconds. A cell’s value on the spreadsheet appeared only 
when the subject placed the cursor on it.  For the verbal task, the standard was 
decoding two five-letter words within 60 seconds.  Subjects were free to continue 
working at a task for the full 60 seconds of a round, even after meeting the standard.  




5 The tournament design literature suggests that effort is promoted best and collusive laziness avoided 
with larger group sizes (eight rather than four or two), and intermediate rather than extreme win rates 
(Orrison et al., 1998; Harbring and Irlenbusch, 2003).   9
2.2 Eliciting Forecasts 
Exactly  how beliefs should be elicited has raised disagreements within 
Economics and Psychology.  At one end, economists such as Dominitz and Manski 
(1997) argue that with suitable preparation, individuals can meaningfully provide 
entire probability distributions to forecast variables such as income.  Eliciting full 
distributions has the advantage of enabling researchers to test for overconfidence both 
in terms of mean and dispersion, as people may form subjective distributions that are 
too tightly concentrated around a (biased) mean.  In contrast, psychologists such as 
Weinstein (1998) argue that the public has difficulty generating even point estimates 
of the mean of a subjective distribution.  Rather, ordinal measures such as "very 
likely" and "somewhat likely" should be used. 
Researchers have commonly taken an intermediate approach of eliciting point 
estimates as numbers between one and 100, or simply one and ten (Viscusi, 1990; 
Fischoff et al., 2000; Morrison and Rutstrom, 2000; Jamison and Karlan, 2003).  We 
also adopt an intermediate approach, asking subjects to report the number of rounds 
out of ten that they expect to win in each set.  We believe that this question is framed 
more naturally than asking about the probability of winning a particular round, and as 
such is likely to yield responses that are more meaningful.  However, by eliciting only 
a point estimate, we can test only for overconfidence as a bias in the mean of subjects' 
subjective distributions, rather than in the dispersion. 
 
2.3 Rewarding Forecast Accuracy and Moral Hazard  
Subjects were rewarded for both their performance on the tasks, and the 
accuracy of their predictions of that performance.  For performance in a set, subjects 
earned two points for each round won.  For accuracy in forecasting performance in 







                                                
         ( 2 )  
where P and W refer respectively to the predicted and realized number of rounds won 
in the set.
6  Accuracy was evaluated for the first set of a task, then for the second set 
based on the revised predictions made after the first set. 
If subjects were risk neutral and making predictions about events they could 
not privately manipulate (a kind of moral hazard), reporting the expected value of 
their subjective probability distribution would maximize earnings.  However in these 
tasks subjects have partial control over the number of wins they are forecasting 
through their (imperfectly observed) choice of effort during a set of rounds.  Subjects 
could purposefully reduce the quality or quantity of their effort in a task in order to 
lose rounds in order to make performance line up with low initial forecasts.
7  We 
address this problem in two ways. 
  First, to reduce the incentive that the scoring rule creates for subjects to alter 
their effort in the tasks, we set the marginal reward from winning an additional round 
(2 points) to exceed any possible marginal loss from increasing forecast error by an 
additional round (ranging from 0.05 points to 0.95 points).
8  Over all four sets of a 
session subjects could accumulate a maximum of 20 points from accurate prediction, 
versus 80 points from actual performance. 
Second, because this reward structure does not eliminate moral hazard 
incentives, as the internal cost to subjects of exerting effort in the tasks is not 
 
6 Quadratic scoring rules have commonly been used in experiments to elicit subjects' beliefs about the 
choices of other subjects or their types (Sonnemans, Schram and Offerman (1998), Morrison and 
Rutstrom (2000), Huck and Weizsacker (2002), Nyarko and Schotter (2002)), or to elicit probabilities 
in the context of Bayesian inference (McKelvey and Page (1990), Grether (1992)). 
7 A similar, though less substantial problem, has arisen in asset market experiments where subjects 
have some (limited) impact on the prices they are forecasting.  Rewarding accuracy had no impact on 
actual prices in these markets (see e.g. Williams (1987)).  In a different context, Offerman and 
Sonnemans (2001) show that incentives had no impact on effort exerted in a prediction task. 
  10
8 The maximum penalty from increased forecast error occurs when the error is increased from 9 to 10 
rounds, costing an additional 0.95 points.  The minimum occurs when the error is increased from 0 to 1 
rounds, costing only 0.05 extra points.   11
                                                
controlled, we also check for moral hazard in practice by running four additional 
relative tournament sessions with non-incentive forecasts.
9  In these sessions subjects 
were asked simply to try their best to predict how many rounds they would win, and 
accumulated points based only on performance.  Since participants in these sessions 
could accumulate fewer points toward the final draw, an un-announced participation 
fee of $4 was added to their final earnings. 
To induce risk neutrality in theory, (though less clearly in practice (Selten et 
al., 1999), we rewarded subjects for accurate prediction and performance with points 
that they accumulate for use in a single draw at the end of the session (as in Berg et al. 
(1986)).  Each subject entered a final private draw between an NZ$8 prize and a 
NZ$30 prize, with the probability of winning $30 given by the number of points 
accumulated from performance and accurate prediction over the session.  Points 
accumulated could vary between 0 and 100. 
 
3.  Experimental Results 
  The fully computerized experiment was conducted at the University of 
Canterbury.
10  In total, 239 student subjects participated in 20 different sessions of the 
experiment as summarized in Table 1.  Students were recruited from large first and 
second year courses in economics, statistics, and mathematics.  Each session took 
approximately one hour and thirty minutes, and earnings ranged from NZ$10 to $42, 
with an average of $23.97.
11
  Table 2 provides a summary of our main results, with more detailed 
descriptive statistics provided in Supplementary Appendix B.  For reasons that will be 
 
9 We believed the incentive to purposefully lose rounds would be strongest in relative tournaments, 
where after the first set had been completed subjects would have a good idea of their ability relative to 
other participants. 
10 The data presented here was part of a larger experiment collecting additional data. 
11 The adult hourly minimum wage in New Zealand at the time of the experiment was NZ$8.50.   12
                                                
described in Section 3.2, we pool results for sessions with and without a scoring rule.  
Whether from experience spillovers or fatigue, results sometimes differed depending 
on the order in which tasks were experienced, and so we report the results in a 
disaggregated form.
12
The number of wins in Set I of a task tended to be lower in the absolute than in 
the relative treatments.  However this was compensated by a larger number of 
absolute wins in Set II, so that overall there was no significant difference in the total 
win rate across the two winning criteria.  Subjects anticipated this potential for 
learning in the absolute treatments, and initially predicted winning on average 
approximately one extra round in Set II.  This effect is absent in the relative 
treatments where the initial predictions for the two sets are indistinguishable. 
 
3.1 Little Overconfidence 
  We move now to our principal investigation of overconfidence in predicting 
own performance.  Our design enables us to test for overconfidence using the ex ante 
group approach of Weinstein, or an individual bias approach using realized outcomes.  
Group bias is testable only in the relative sessions, by asking whether the predicted 
number of wins per set, averaged across all subjects, differed significantly from the 
promised average win rate of 4.17.  The last two columns of Table 2 provide the 
results. 
  We find limited evidence of group overconfidence bias, but only for the 
maximization task, and only when it was the first task experienced.  In that 
tournament and order, t-tests indicate that the average predicted number of wins 
 
12 In relative tournaments, Mann-Whitney tests detected significant order effects for predictions and 
forecast error in the maximization task, though not the decoding task.  In absolute contests, order 
effects were found for revised forecast errors in the maximization task, and in some measures of effort 
quality and quantity in both tasks.   13
(4.76) over 72 participants in Set I was significantly higher than the (known) actual 
number of wins (4.17).  This initial overconfidence persisted even in the revised Set II 
prediction (4.71), made after the group experienced the ten rounds of Set I.  In 
contrast, when the maximization task was experienced second, subjects were initially 
under-confident, predicting a mean win rate of only 3.61, before revising to no 
significant difference from 4.17 in Set II forecasts.  Mean predicted wins for the 
verbal decoding task were generally indistinguishable from 4.17, the only deviation 
being initial Set I under-confidence (3.61) when the task was experienced first. 
  Moving to realized outcome analysis, we compare the predictions of each 
individual to his or her outcome.  Here we test for mean forecast errors that differ 
significantly from zero, and can do so in tasks with both relative and absolute criteria 
for success.  First, we define forecast error, ERRORi as the difference between the 
number of rounds subject i predicted she was going to win, and the number she did 
win.  ERRORi may be positive, zero, or negative, indicating ex post that the subject's 
forecast turned out to be overconfident, accurate, or under-confident, respectively.  
We look for systematic forecast errors by testing whether the sample mean of ERRORi 
is significantly different from zero, whether positive or negative.  The mean error 
rates are also reported in Table 2. 
Beginning with the relative tournaments, the results are consistent with those 
found using group bias analysis.  We find robust overconfidence in maximization 
when it was experienced first, under-confidence giving way to zero mean bias when it 
was experienced second, and zero mean error for verbal decoding.  The initial under-
confidence previously found in the verbal tournament when experienced first is no 
longer significant.   
Scatter plots of individual revised Set II predictions and outcomes for the 
relative tournaments are shown in Figure 4.  Points above the 45-degree line indicate   14
under-confidence, while points below reflect overconfidence.  The figure shows that 
where subjects were accurate on average (3 of 4 cases) this resulted from an even split 
between those who were over- and under-confident rather than from widespread 
individual accuracy.  Overconfidence in the final case (maximization when first) 
resulted from a majority having positive forecast errors. 
Moving to the accuracy of forecasts in absolute contests, we find a greater 
deviation from zero mean error, but not in the direction of overconfidence.  For the 
maximization task when it comes first, we find no significant mean forecast error for 
either set.  When maximization comes second, subjects begin with positive mean error 
in Set I and then overcorrect to negative mean error for the revised forecast for Set II.  
In fact, the initial forecasts for Set II that would have turned out to be accurate were 
revised to be excessively negative. 
  Even more strikingly, subjects showed persistent negative mean forecast error 
in the verbal decoding contest regardless of order.  Revised Set II predictions reduced 
the error over initial Set II predictions, but not by nearly enough to eliminate it.  In 
fact, the revised predictions for Set II were no more accurate than the initial 
predictions for Set I, as subjects failed to anticipate continuing improvement even 
after 12 rounds of experience!  On average subjects ultimately expected to win 
between 1.2 and 1.7 fewer rounds over a set than they actually did. 
  Scatter plots of individual Set II predictions and outcomes in absolute contests 
are shown in Figure 5.  As with forecasts of relative ability, individual errors were 
often quite large.  Under-confidence in the verbal task is clearly illustrated, with 
almost all subjects having negative forecast errors.     
A summary of these results is provided in Figure 6, and leads to the following 
observations.  First, mean accuracy is more common than either over- or under-
confidence.  Second, under-confidence is more prevalent than over-confidence.    15
                                                
However the results tend to be task specific, with overconfidence more prevalent in 
the maximization task, and under-confidence in the verbal task.  In addition, 
significant mean forecast error (in either direction) is more common in the absolute 
treatments than the relative, persisting in Set II revised forecasts in three of four cases 
for the former, versus one in four cases for the latter.  Possible explanations for these 
patterns are discussed in Section 4. 
 
3.2 Forecast Incentives, Moral Hazard and Accuracy  
  We find no evidence that using a quadratic scoring rule to modestly reward 
subjects for forecast accuracy altered the observable effort they made in either the 
maximization or verbal tournaments.
13  We compared measures of prediction, effort 
quality and quantity, and outcomes for sessions with and without the scoring rule in 
both task orders.
14  Mann-Whitney tests discerned no significant differences in any 
variables in any set or order, with one borderline exception.  In particular, the initial 
predictions for Set I of the maximization task when it came first was marginally more 
pessimistic with the scoring rule than without (ρ = 0.104). 
Did rewarding subjects for forecast accuracy make them better forecasters?  
Our results suggest not.  Our modest scoring rule did not reduce either the mean or 
variance of forecast errors.  In particular, recall that our design yields six ERRORi 
observations per subject: one for the first set of a task, an initial and revised one for 
the second set of the task, and three analogous measures for the second task.  As 
 
13 Unfortunately, an error appeared in the instructions illustrating the working of the quadratic scoring 
rule.  In particular, the scoring rule (2) was first (correctly) described to subjects in words.  Two 
worked examples immediately followed, however, in which the term in parentheses on the left hand 
side of (2) was shown as multiplied by 2, rather than raised to the power 2.  However the points 
generated on the right hand side in each case corresponded to squaring.  None of the 240 subjects 
queried the error, and given the correct verbal description of the formula in the immediately preceding 
paragraph, we believe they would have understood that the bracket should have been squared.  See 
Supplementary Appendix A for more detail. 
14 Measures of effort quantity and quality are described more fully in the next section.    16
                                                
Mann-Whitney tests confirm, none of these ERROR measures was significantly 
different when the scoring rule was used than when it was omitted.
15  Similarly, 
Levene’s Test for the Equality of Variance detected no difference in the variance of 
any of the ERROR measures. 
In short, we find that using a modest quadratic scoring rule to reward accurate 
forecasts brought neither moral hazard nor greater forecast accuracy.  This is why we 
pooled sessions in Table 2 that differed only in their use of forecast incentives. 
 
3.3 Auxiliary Findings 
  Aside from examining mean forecast errors, we also test 1) whether they vary 
systematically with subject characteristics, 2) whether ex ante overconfidence helps 
subjects do better in subsequent tasks, and 3) whether subjects learn from initial 
errors.  To this end, we passively recorded participants’ keystroke entries during each 
task, and collected demographic data following each session.  From the keystroke 
records we derived measures of the quantity and quality of subjects’ efforts at each 
task.  Each measure was averaged over the ten rounds of a set. 
Effort quantity was defined as the number of keys pressed per round in the 
verbal decoding task, or number of spreadsheet cells entered in the maximization task.   
Censoring hampers the measurement of effort quantity in tasks with absolute criteria 
for winning, because efforts beyond those needed to win a round are not counted.  
Using the censored results directly could make it appear that successful subjects in a 
given round made little effort, while the unsuccessful made much.  Instead, when 
 
15 These results are confirmed in subsequent regression analysis.      17
                                                
measuring a subject's average effort quantity over a set in absolute contests, we 
average only over the rounds of the set that he or she lost.
16   
Effort quality was defined initially using a number of plausible measures that 
we programmed the computer server to calculate as data was collected.
17  From these 
alternative measures we selected those whose ex post bivariate correlation with 
winning in a given set exceeded 0.3, but whose correlation in that set with similar 
measures did not exceed 0.6.  For the decoding task, our filter left Letters Decoded 
Per Keys Pressed, because subjects who made fewer, targeted guesses won more 
often than subjects who guessed randomly or who entered every letter on the 
keyboard systematically.  For the maximization task, our filter left Percentage Smart 
Moves and Percentage New Moves.  The first refers to an absence of persevering on 
the spreadsheet in directions where the function value was falling, and the second to 
the absence of backtracking through cells that had already been searched.  As in the 
verbal task, purposeful rather than random search strategies were more successful on 
average.  Descriptive statistics for these and all demographic and treatment variables 
are provided in Supplementary Appendix B. 
To test whether errors vary with subject characteristics, we regressed initial 
and revised Set II forecast errors on Set II effort quantity and quality measures and 
demographics, under both relative and absolute winning criteria.  The results are 
reported in Appendix I.  Since our Set II effort quantity and quality measures might 
 
16 This excludes three and five subjects from analysis of Set II of the maximization and verbal contests, 
respectively.  Those excluded won all ten rounds of the set.  As an alternative specification, we omitted 
effort quantity altogether from the four regressions for absolute contests.  The fit of these regressions is 
poorer in three of the four cases, and effort quality measures that were not already significant (in initial 
and revised maximization) became so. 
17 For the verbal task, we defined three measures of effort quality: (1) the proportion of letters 
successfully decoded as a percentage of all keys pressed (including number or punctuation keys), (2) 
the proportion of letters guessed two or more times for a given letter position, and (3) the proportion of 
letters guessed three or more times for a given letter position.  For the maximization task we measured 
quality by (1) the lack of perseverance in incorrect directions, (2) the lack of backtracking through 
previously explored cells, and (3) the average height gained over total number of moves.     18
                                                
themselves be influenced by forecast error, we also ran corresponding instrumental 
variable (IV) regressions, with Set II effort measures instrumented on corresponding 
Set I measures.  Hausman specification tests failed to reject the null of exogeneity in 
all cases, and so we report only OLS results.
18
  As is clear from Appendix I, very little of the variation in initial or revised 
subject forecast error is explained by subject characteristics such as gender, age, self-
reported grade range (A, B, or C), or first language status.  There is a limited tendency 
for males to show a higher (overconfident) forecast error in initial forecasts in some 
treatments, but not in revised forecasts.  More curiously, there is a tendency for those 
who used greater effort quantity or quality in the verbal task towards negative forecast 
errors (under-confidence), both in initial and revised forecasts. 
  Next, we test whether subjects who exhibited initial overconfidence regarding 
the first task encountered persevered to do better on the second set of the subsequent 
task.   As reported in Appendix II, we regress second task Set II win rates on effort 
quantity and quality in that task and set, then repeat the regression adding Set I and 
then revised Set II forecast errors from the first task. A significant coefficient on the 
first task forecast errors would indicate a direct effect of overconfidence on 
subsequent cross-task performance, while a drop in the coefficients on effort across 
regressions would indicate an indirect effect of overconfidence on performance via 
higher effort quality or quantity.  Contrary to the hypotheses summarized by Taylor 
and Brown (1988), we find no evidence that initial overconfidence has either direct or 
indirect effects on subsequent performance under either criteria of winning or order of 
 
18 Chi-square values ranged from 0.26 to 5.75 in eight tests by task, criteria for winning, and initial or 
revised forecasts.  The corresponding p-values ranged from 1.000 to 0.889.  In any event, coefficient 
estimates and significance levels were very similar in OLS and IV regressions. 
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tasks.  Effort coefficients (jointly tested) never differ significantly as forecast errors 
are added, and first task forecast errors are never statistically significant. 
Turning finally to learning, we find reassuring evidence that subjects do 
update predictions for Set II of a task in the direction of the realized Set I forecast 
error.  In particular, we regress subjects’ revised predicted number of wins for Set II 
of a task on their initial predicted number of wins for Set II (their "priors"), and the 
error of their forecast from Set I (new information).  OLS regressions were run 
separately for each task under both relative and absolute winning criteria, as shown in 
Table 3.  In all four cases the prior and new information were significant at any 
conventional level, and subjects on average lowered revised predictions if Set I 
predictions turned out to be overconfident.  Subjects were also more anchored to 
initial Set II predictions in the relative tournaments than in the absolute contests, with 
a significant difference in coefficient magnitudes between columns (3) to (1) and (4) 
to (2).  Subjects however did not always revise Set II forecasts sufficiently to 
eliminate initial mean bias, or to preserve the lack of it.  Returning to Table 2, there 
are eight treatment cells of task, order, and criteria for winning.  In three of these 
treatment cells, Set II mean forecast error differed significantly from zero both in 
initial and revised forecasts, and in only one of these (absolute, verbal, maximization 
first) did the revision reduce the mean forecast error significantly (using a t-test).  In a 
fourth treatment cell (absolute, maximization, verbal first) mean forecast error did not 
differ from zero initially, but changed significantly in revision, ending significantly 
negative!  In the four remaining treatment cells however, mean forecast error was 
indiscernibly close to zero initially and did not change significantly in revision. 
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4.  Discussion and Conclusions 
Overconfidence can have important economic consequences, but has received 
little direct testing within the discipline.  The evidence that does exist is mixed, in 
contrast with the robust psychological evidence for the “above-average” effect.   
However, this data has been collected from hypothetical surveys without feedback or 
opportunities for learning or revision.  We use laboratory experiments to address these 
limitations.  Subjects participate in two experimental tasks, and are rewarded for both 
performance and accuracy of their predictions. 
We fail to find confirmation of a robust overconfidence bias, either at the 
aggregate level as done in earlier studies, or at the individual level where predictions 
are compared to outcomes.  We find limited evidence of overconfidence for only one 
of two tasks, in one of two orders, with one of two criteria for winning – maximizing 
an unknown function on a spreadsheet when it is the first task encountered, and when 
the criteria for winning is performance relative to others.  We find no such bias about 
relative performance in the same task when it is experienced after another task, nor in 
a verbal decoding task in any order, nor in any forecasts of performance of either task 
against an absolute threshold.
19
Overall our results suggest that mean accuracy is more common than either 
over- or under-confidence, and that when systematic errors occur under-confidence is 
actually more prevalent than over-confidence.  Moreover, the results tend to be task 
specific with overconfidence more prevalent in the maximization task, and under-
confidence more common in the verbal task.  In addition, predictions tended to be less 
accurate in the absolute treatments than the relative.  We found significant under-
confidence persisting in revised Set II forecasts in three of the four cases for absolute 
 
19 We do find initial overconfidence for absolute maximization performance when it is experienced 
after verbal contests, but it does not persist to initial or revised Set II forecasts.   21
                                                
contests, versus significant overconfidence in only one of four cases for relative 
tournaments. 
What features may account for these differences?  First, we originally 
hypothesized that predicting absolute success rates would be easier than relative ones, 
because the former requires knowledge of your own abilities, whereas the latter also 
required knowledge of others’ abilities.  On reflection, however, predictions about 
relative ability require different, rather than additional information.  In the decoding 
task, for example, subjects need only estimate whether their ability ranks in the top 
five or bottom seven of the twelve participants in the session, and not also whether 
they could decode a certain number of letters. 
  Second, we postulate that the feedback from the two practice rounds that 
preceded each task provided more helpful information in the relative tournaments 
than in the absolute contests.  In the relative tournaments, 42% of subjects (or five of 
twelve) were guaranteed to win each practice round, and so every subject gained two 
signals of their ability relative to other session participants.  If relative ability 
remained stable across the twelve participants as the session progressed, these signals 
would be very informative.  In contrast, in absolute contests, few subjects were able to 
attain the thresholds required in only two practice rounds.
20  This would tell most 
subjects only that they were starting well below the threshold required, and give them 
two observations from which to extrapolate their own trajectories of improvement 
over the following 20 rounds. 
Finally, we speculate that the under-confident forecast bias for the verbal task 
in particular was made possible by that task’s greater scope for improvement with 
experience. Decoding words required considerable keyboard skills, and offered more 
 
20 3 and 21 percent won the first and second practice rounds of the maximization task, respectively.  
For the decoding task, the corresponding numbers were 0 and 15 percent.   22
channels for improvement in technique.  Indeed, there was an “increasing return to 
improvement,” as letters decoded early in a round assisted in the decoding of 
subsequent words within that round.  In contrast, maximization did not require intense 
keyboard skills, and improvements in technique were limited to insights gained over 
triangulation, efficient use of the arrow keys, and the need to pay constant attention.  
Our speculation is partially supported by the observation that average success rates 
changed more dramatically from first to second sets in absolute decoding contests 
(+1.76 rounds when first, +1.85 rounds when second) than in absolute maximization 
contests (+0.77 rounds when first, +1.85 rounds when second).  With more potential 
for improvement comes a greater potential not to recognize it.  
  Among auxiliary results, we found that little in the variation of forecast errors 
could be explained by subject characteristics such as gender or first language.   
However subjects who exerted greater or “smarter” effort in the verbal task in 
particular did not adequately account for this in their forecasts, and thus had 
substantially more negative errors than others. This might suggest that most subjects 
had little idea ex ante idea of which decoding strategy would be the most successful.  
We also found no evidence in support of the hypothesis that subjects with initial 
overconfidence performed better in a subsequent task, whether directly, or indirectly 
via higher effort quantity or quality.  Regarding learning, subjects generally revised 
second set predictions in the direction of first set outcomes, but not always 
sufficiently to eliminate initial mean forecast errors where they occurred. 
  Finally, regarding the methodology of eliciting predictions in experiments, we 
find that offering modest incentives for accurate forecasts using a quadratic scoring 
rule did not seem to trigger moral hazard problems in subsequent performance.  But 
neither did it reduce the mean or variance of forecast errors.  Increasing the relative 
reward from prediction over performance might improve the latter, but also trigger the   23
former.  Until this is investigated, our results lend support to the practice of measuring 
peoples’ expectations over outcomes that have incentives with prediction elicitation 
questions that do not.   24



















         
1  Relative  Maximization Yes  1, 2, 9, 10  48 
2 Relative  Maximization No 17,  18  24 
3  Relative  Verbal  Yes  5, 6, 15, 16  48 
4 Relative  Verbal  No 19,  20  24 
5  Absolute  Maximization Yes  3, 4, 11, 12  48 
6  Absolute  Verbal  Yes  7, 8, 13, 14  46
b,c
 
a Each session contained 12 participants. 
b There were only 11 participants in one of these sessions. 
c One of the subjects somehow circumvented the programmed constraint that spreadsheet 
search in the maximization contest be between contiguous cells.  Fortunately, this was in an 
absolute contest session, and had no spillover effects to other participants.  The results for this 
subject were excluded from the analysis. 
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Table 2:  Summary of Mean Results 
_______________________________________________________________________ 
 
           ABSOLUTE  CONTESTS  RELATIVE  TOURNAMENTS 
  
           Maximization  Verbal   Maximization  Verbal 
           First        First    First    First 
    N  =  48   N  =  46   N  =  72   N=72   




Predicted  Wins/10  Set  I   3.77   3.67   4.76**   3.61** 
Predicted Wins/10 Set II  4.63    4.76    4.89***    3.75 
     
Actual  Wins  Set  I   3.19   2.74   4.17   4.17 
 
Revised Predicted Wins Set II   4.33    3.80    4.71**    3.97 
 
Actual  Wins  Set  II   3.96   4.59   4.17   4.17 
 
Individual Error (Pred. – Wins) 
 Set  I       0.58   0.93**   0.60*      -0.56*   
 Initial  Set  II   0.67   0.17   0.72**   -0.42 





Predicted  Wins/10  Set  I   2.44   2.57   3.75   3.61** 
Predicted Wins/10 Set II  2.94    3.46    3.96    3.96 
 
Actual Wins Set I    3.42    3.07    4.15
a   4.17 
 
Revised Predicted Wins Set II   3.58    3.67    4.21    3.97 
 
Actual Wins Set II    5.27    4.83    4.15
a   4.15
a 
 
Individual Error (Pred. – Wins)     
 Set  I    -0.98**   -0.50   -0.40   -0.56 
 Initial  Set  II   -2.33***  -1.37**   -0.19   -0.19 
 Revised  Set  II   -1.69**   -1.15***  -0.01   -0.18 
_____________________________________________________________________    
 
*, **, *** denote significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively, in two tailed t-
tests.  In the case of Predicted Wins, denotes significant difference from average win rate.  In 
the case of the Individual Error measures, indicates significant difference from zero. 
 
a  A minor feedback error resulted in one subject in one set in each of three sessions being told 
and rewarded as if he or she had won one fewer rounds than was the case.  This lowered the 
aggregate wins averaged per round to 4.08 (= 49 wins/120 rounds) for the flawed set, and 
4.15 when combined with the five error-free sets. 
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Table 3:  Learning 
     
 
 
DEPENDENT VARIABLE: Revised Predicted Wins Set II 
          
   ABSOLUTE  CONTESTS  RELATIVE TOURNAMENTS
        
    Maximization Verbal Maximization Verbal
        
Initial Predicted   



















Set I    (0.050) (0.056) (0.039) (0.039) 
        
Order of Task   0.397  -0.014  0.358
* 0.328 
(Max. First =1)    (0.248) (0.287) (0.208) (0.229) 
        
Constant    0.714
** 0.792
** -0.054 -0.090 
    (0.309) (0.353) (0.244) (0.294) 
        
        
N   94  94  144  144 
        
Adjusted R
2   0.734 0.644 0.775 0.714 
 
 
*, **, *** denote significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively, in two tailed t-
tests.  High values of Forecast Error indicate predictions that are more confident.  Numbers 
in parentheses are standard errors.  Estimated using Stata 7. 
 







This (hypothetical) subject is in the first practice round, with 11 of 60 seconds 
remaining.  By moving the cursor from cell to cell, he has reached the value (or 
“height”) of 1654.  This version of the maximization task has an absolute criteria for 
winning:  reaching or exceeding the target value of 100,000. 
 






This (hypothetical) subject is in the first practice round, with 14 of 60 seconds 
remaining.  He has successfully decoded one entire word, “mraqo” as “scone”, and 
the second and third letters of a second word, “ifkog.”  Correctly decoded letters in 




  28Figure 3: Sequence of Decisions for a Given Task 
 
 
                                         
 
2 Practice Rounds 
of Task 
Forecast # of Wins (0-10) 
in First Set of 10 Rounds 
            
Forecast # of Wins (0-10) 
in Second Set of 10 Rounds 
Do First Set 
of 10 Rounds 
Revise Forecast of # Wins 
(0-10) in Second Set 
Do Second Set 
of 10 Rounds 
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Figure 6: Incidence of Mean Error Overconfidence, Accuracy, and Under-
Confidence 
 
Forecast Error in  Overconfidence Accuracy  Under-confidence 
Set I  S  UU  S 
Initial Set II  S  SUU   
Revised Set II  S  SUU   
 
Key:    S = relative maximization tournaments (in both orders) 
U = relative verbal decoding tournaments (in both orders) 
 = absolute maximization contests (in both orders) 
 = absolute verbal decoding contests (in both orders) 
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Appendix I: Determinants of Initial and Revised Forecast Errors for Set II 
_____________________________________________________________________ 
 
DEPENDENT     Initial Set II Forecast Error       Revised Set II Forecast Error 
VARIABLE    
    
      Relative        Absolute   Relative         Absolute 
      Tournaments       Contests    Tournaments       Contests 
 
      Max    Verbal       Max    Verbal  Max     Verbal       Max     Verbal 





  MALE           --   0.869
*       -1.265
**       --         --          
     --          --             --             
   (0.479)       (0.574)       
   
  AGE           --      --         --            --        --           --          --            -0.065
**          
 
                           (0.028)
               
  GRADE AVE         --      --         --            --                   --         --          --              -- 
  
  ENGLISH 1
ST          --      --         --            --         --         --          --              --
             
 
  TAKEN ECON         --      --        1.741
***       --        --         --          --            0.794
*  
            (0.650)                                (0.447)                  
 
  TAKEN STAT         --      --          --       -1.241
*            --         --        -0.963
*     -1.042
**   
 
                 (0.654)             (0.577)      (0.461)            
 






  CELLS ENTERED    --        
            --        0.034
**          -0.030
*      
                 (0.014)         (0.018)   
   
  % SMART CELLS   -0.116
***             -0.225
***          --                 --           
         (0.028)           (0.078) 
 
  % NEW CELLS                --                          --      
           
 
  KEYS PRESSED             -0.083
***         -0.056
***             -0.023
***                   -0.030
***         
 
                  (0.010)          (0.009)        (0.008)                 (0.006)             
  
   #DECODED PER         -105.8
***         -88.28
***       -50.93
***          -59.47
***      
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Appendix I Continued: 
 
___________________________________________________________________________ 
       
DEPENDENT      Initial Set II Forecast Error     Revised Set II Forecast Error 
VARIABLE    
 
      Relative        Absolute   Relative         Absolute 
      Tournaments       Contests    Tournaments       Contests 
 
      Max    Verbal       Max    Verbal  Max     Verbal       Max     Verbal 
  ______________________________________________________________ 
 
Other Variables  
 
  ORDER (MV=1)      0.957
*      --         1.356
**   -1.110
**       -- 
        --       1.563
***      
 --                 
 
         (0.543)            (0.592)   (0.512)              (0.499)         
 
  SCORING RULE       --          --                        --        --            
 
  WON 1 PRACTICE   --          --          1.568
**      --     1.181
**           --             --            --                         
  ROUND                 (0.718)    (0.489)      
 
  WON 2 PRACTICE   --     1.723
***        --            a        --      1.274
***       --            a                            
  ROUNDS       (0.607)                        (0.490)        
 
 CONSTANT         --     17.89
***     55.60
***  13.18
***        --     6.167
***    33.71
***      9.457
***             





b         143       141           91            89     143   141             91           89                           
 
Adjusted R
2       0.084     0.350        0.261      0.409    0.058   0.123          0.140         0.336                                   
                                       
___________________________________________________________________________ 
 
*, **, *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively.  Run on Stata 7.  
Numbers in parentheses are standard errors.  Eligible but insignificant coefficients are 
retained but not reported, and are denoted by “--”. 
 
a No individuals won both practice rounds in this treatment. 
 
b  Sample sizes vary because of a missing observation for AGE, and incomplete data for 
CELLS ENTERED (5)  or  KEYS PRESSED (3) using our censored measures for absolute 
contests, and for #DECODED PER KEY PRESSED (2) for the relative verbal tournaments.         
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Appendix IIa: Overconfidence and Better Outcomes - Relative  
___________________________________________________________________________ 
 
DEPENDENT VARIABLE:  Actual Number of Wins in Set II 
     
             Maximization when Second  Verbal Decoding when Second 
          ___________________________________________________________ 
 
Effort in Set II Of Second Task 
 
  CELLS ENTERED       0.004   0.003      0.002
 
             (0.017)  (0.017)     (0.018)                     
 
  % SMART CELLS       0.104
***   0.104
***     0.103
*** 
             (0.036)  (0.037)     (0.037) 
  
  KEYS PRESSED                0.069
**       0.071
***       0.071
*** 
                      (0.011)      (0.011)        (0.011) 
 
      #DECODED  PER          99.14
***      98.67
***     97.42
***   
    K E Y   P R E S S E D          (12.65)      (12.67)       (12.83) 
 
 
Forecast Error            -0.019      -0.027           -0.069          -0.068 
In Set I of       (0.102)      (0.106)            (0.075)        (0.075)   
Prior Task 
 
Revised Forecast           0.048               -0.069 





  MALE              2.054
*** 2.067
***      2.105
***      --            --   -- 
              (0.693)  (0.701)       (0.718) 
 
  WON 1 PRACTICE      --      --          --    1.003
*         0.976
*         0.959
*  
  ROUND            (0.567)        (0.567)        (0.571) 
 
  WON 2 PRACTICE    --      --          --    1.432
**        1.479
**       1.434
**  
  ROUNDS            (0.637)        (0.640)        (0.645) 
 
  TAKEN STAT            1.091
* 1.082
*          --        --            --    -- 
              (0.647)  (0.654)             
  
  GRADE AVE               --      --          --        --            --    -- 
 
N                 72     72         72       72           72    72       
  
Adjusted R
2             0.287    0.276         0.266  0.664        0.663  0.661 
___________________________________________________________________________ 
 
*, **, *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively in two tailed tests.  
Run on Stata 7.  Numbers in parentheses are standard errors.  Some eligible but insignificant 
coefficients are retained but not reported, and are denoted by “--”.   36
Appendix IIb: Overconfidence and Better Outcomes - Absolute  
_________________________________________________________________________ 
    
DEPENDENT VARIABLE:  Actual Number of Wins in Set II 
 
              Maximization when Second     Verbal Decoding when Second 
                  __________________________________________________________ 
 
Effort in Set II Of Second Task 
 
  CELLS ENTERED      0.037
**    0.035
**      0.034
**      
 
             (0.015)    (0.016)     (0.015)                         
 
  % SMART CELLS       0.259
***      0.247
***     0.249
***       
           (0.077)    (0.078)      (0.077) 
 
  % NEW CELLS           0.161  0.185     0.139 
              (0.161)   (0.164)     (0.163)               
 
  KEYS PRESSED                0 . 0 6 4
***    0.064
***      0.067
***
         (0.007)     (0.007)       (0.008)    
 
  #DECODED  PER        106.1
***    106.4
***     106.9
*** 
  KEY  PRESSED        (12.60)     (13.13)      (13.21) 
 
Forecast Error           -0.102     -0.050          0.007          0.002 
In Set I of        (0.116)     (0.118)        (0.082)        (0.082) 
Prior Task 
 
Revised Forecast             -0.242               -0.102 





  MALE             1.107
*     1.115
*     1.227
**      --          --              -- 
           (0.574)    (0.576)     (0.568)                       
 
  WON 1 PRACTICE      --         --        --         --          --              --   
  ROUND 
 
  WON 2 PRACTICE      --         --        --        a          a              a 
  ROUNDS 
 
  TAKEN STAT             --         --        --      1.114
**      1.117
**       1.008
** 
            (0.448)      (0.455)       (0.477) 
   
GRADE AVE           1.103
**     1.066
**      1.022
**        --           --              --   
              (0.446)     (0.450)      (0.441) 
 
N
b             43    43      43        45          45              45 
  
Adjusted R
2           0.525  0.522      0.542          0.716         0.708          0.705 
__________________________________________________________________________ 
 
*, **, *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively in two tailed tests.  Run on 
Stata 7.  Numbers in parentheses are standard errors.  Some eligible but insignificant coefficients are 
retained but not reported, and are denoted by “--”. 
a  No individuals won both practice rounds in this treatment. 
b Sample sizes vary because of incomplete data for gross effort using our censored measure for 
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